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 In this paper I will argue that holding Christian beliefs is consistent with intellectual 
virtues. I must first clarify that holding Christian beliefs does not consist only in the affirmation 
of certain propositions like “God exists”. This is not to say that affirming certain doctrine is not 
essential to Christian belief, but this is only part of what it encompasses. When I refer to 
Christianity and Christian beliefs in this paper, I mean affirming basic religious propositions like 
“Jesus was the son of God”, but I also take certain practices to be part of Christian belief. For 
example, spiritual disciplines (practices like prayer, study of scripture, meditation, etc.) are a 
major facet of Christianity, as well as practices like involvement in a local community of other 
believers. While some accept that belief in a vague, higher power might be epistemically 
innocuous, they argue that to believe in the God described in the Christian faith is asking one to 
accept too many propositions not supported by reason1. This view is misguided. I will argue that, 
on the contrary, one can believe in God and maintain the practices of Christianity while leading a 
rigorous life of the mind. 
I will begin (in section 2) by defining intellectual virtues, borrowing largely from Jason 
Baehr’s account and argue that Christian beliefs are compatible with intellectual virtues 
understood as such. Then (in section 3) I will lay out some evidential support for Christianity 
using William Alston’s discussion of religious experience. Then I will move away from 
evidential considerations into more practical ones, shifting the discussion (in sections 4 and 5) to 
how practical considerations can justify Christian beliefs. I will argue that one should have 
intellectual loyalty, or epistemic bias towards her Christian beliefs, and that this bias towards her 
 
1 This is Miriam Schleifer McCormick’s view. See Chapter 3 of her Believing Agency the Evidence: Agency and the 
Ethics of Belief. 
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own belief will ultimately make her more open-minded towards other beliefs. Then I will argue 
that the hope Christianity provides adds to its justification. Finally, in Section 6, I will address a 
potential objection that maintaining Christian beliefs requires similar sorts of intellectual vices 
that we see in extreme conspiracy theorists. 
II. Intellectual Virtues 
 In this section, I will define intellectual virtues, primarily using Jason Baehr’s account in 
his book “The Inquiring Mind”. Before I move to discussing intellectual virtues, it is necessary 
that I first make a few clarifying points. First, I do not intend to lay out all the different beliefs 
one must accept in any Christian tradition. My purpose is not to provide a theological defense of 
every detail of Christianity, but rather to argue that it is possible to hold Christian beliefs and 
also be an intellectually virtuous person. I also must point out that I am not trying to argue that 
being a Christian is sufficient for one to be intellectually virtuous. There are many Christians 
who are not interested in engaging with views other than their own, and merely believe what 
they do because it is what has always been taught to them. While I do not think this way of living 
is necessarily morally wrong, this type of blind acceptance certainly does not qualify as 
intellectual virtue. Now I will move on to defining intellectual virtues.  
Gaining truth about the world is a difficult task, but there are still some things are 
obvious to us and are not exceedingly difficult to learn. If I am sitting in the kitchen and I hear a 
crash in the living room, I can walk over and find out with very little difficulty what happened. 
There is hardly any effort involved for me. Or to mention a more theoretical example, I do not 
know what 3486+23985 equals, but it would be quite easy for me to find that out by just typing it 
into a calculator. Truths like these are easy to discover. It is also quite easy to have the 
appearance of learning without gaining true knowledge. I can watch hours of cable news and feel 
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like I have become a significantly more informed person, but it may be that I have just learned 
how to better repeat a cable network narrative. Discovering meaningful truths involves a lot of 
difficulty. For example, while I was easily able to figure out that the previously mentioned sum 
came out to 27471, the process for trying to discern and articulate some of the intellectual merits 
of religious beliefs in this paper has been a very strenuous process that has taken much hard 
work and thought.  
While I have mentioned some more trivial examples of pursuing knowledge, Jason Baehr 
gives some more profound examples where intellectual virtues were demonstrated. He discusses 
Frederick Douglass, a former slave who escaped and became a leader in the abolition movement 
in the 1800’s, who worked his hardest to train himself to read as a slave because he thirsted for 
the freedom of mind that he could only gain through education. In his autobiography, Douglass 
talks about trading his meals to children in his neighborhood in return for a little teaching on how 
to read. He says regarding this practice, “This bread I used to bestow on the hungry little urchins, 
who, in return, would give me that more valuable bread of knowledge” (Douglass 34). In 
Douglass we see a man who was so passionate for knowledge that he fought to learn and would 
trade his food to children while he was on errands so that he could gain just a little more of it. 
Gaining knowledge is not some mechanical process that one can just turn on, but it requires 
struggling past physical and intellectual hindrances. As Baehr says, referring to difficult cases of 
seeking knowledge, “As such [the acquisition of knowledge] makes demands on us as cognitive 
agents-- it requires that we think, reason, judge, evaluate, read, interpret, adjudicate, search, or 
reflect in various ways” (Baehr 2011, 18). While all these actions require natural ability and 
proper functioning of the mind, they also require a certain level of learned traits. For this reason, 
Baehr distinguishes between traits that come naturally to us and intellectual virtues.  
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Baehr describes many of these natural traits that might easily be confused with 
intellectual virtues and distinguishes them from each other, but I will just focus on what he calls 
faculties and skills. Under the category of cognitive faculties, Baehr lists our senses, memory, 
introspection and reason (Baehr 2011, 22). He goes on to describe three ways in which these 
faculties differ from our intellectual virtues. The first is that faculties “are part of our natural or 
native cognitive endowment” (Baehr 2011, 22). Intellectual virtues take work and conscious 
effort to develop. Although there may be ways to sharpen one’s memory, or become more 
proficient at introspection, these traits are much more clearly tied to one’s genetic makeup than 
intellectual virtues. Although we may have certain natural bents towards different intellectual 
virtues, being, for example, open-minded is a conscious choice I must make and I must nurture, 
whereas my memory is just a function of my brain. Another important difference that Baehr 
points out is that faculties are not personal in the same way that intellectual virtues are (Baehr 
2011, 23). I will expand on this idea later in the paper, but Baehr argues that intellectual virtues 
speak to one’s character in a way that faculties cannot. He says, “To say of someone that she is 
inquisitive, attentive, fair-minded… that she prizes knowledge and understanding above 
reputation, wealth, or pleasure… is to say something about who she is as a person” (Baehr 2011, 
23).  
While we do, at times, criticize or praise people for their faculties, I contend that labeling 
someone virtuous or vicious on account of their innate abilities is not warranted. If I happened to 
be born with a photographic memory, this would not merit my being considered a good person. 
Furthermore, if I were to develop some form of dementia, it would, at best, be misinformed to 
say that I was a worse person on account of my illness. It is true that many times we will praise 
people for their natural abilities, but people who we praise with natural abilities usually hone 
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those abilities somehow, and this is a major part of what warrants our praise of them. In fact, we 
tend to look down on people with natural abilities who do not use them well. I have been a life-
long Penn State football fan and I can vividly remember how frustrating it was to have Christian 
Hackenberg as our quarterback. It was uniquely frustrating because he was one of the most 
talented quarterbacks we had ever had at the position, and yet he seemed to give up half-way 
through his career. This was one of the most angering things I had experienced as a middle 
schooler because I could see the athlete was talented enough to bring value to our team and help 
us win, but he was squandering it2. Faculties are part of our genetic makeup, and although how 
one uses her faculties very much involves intellectual virtues, they are two clearly different 
things.  
Another trait that Baehr distinguishes from intellectual virtues is the category of skills. 
Baehr defines skills as “abilities to perform certain reasonably specific or technical intellectual 
tasks” (Baehr 2011, 29). Skills include categories like teaching, coding, and writing. They are the 
abilities that allow us to function in our occupations, but, just like faculties, they do not reflect on 
our character. Skills and virtues are closely related, though. As Baehr points out, both skills and 
intellectual virtues are cultivated, and developing skills usually requires a certain level of virtue, 
but the two are still quite distinct from one another. Baehr argues that skills are not personal in 
the same way that intellectual virtues are. Although skills are more closely related to intellectual 
virtues than faculties, they do not clearly contribute to personal worth (Baehr 2011, 30). I happen 
to be a very poor coder. I just barely scraped by in my introductory computer science class with a 
passing grade. But this does not poorly reflect on my character. If I were able to push past my 
 
2 To be completely fair to Hackenberg, he did not have a very competent offensive line protecting him, but the 
purpose of this paper is not football analysis, so I will not pursue this any further.  
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natural inability and become an above average coder, it would require intellectual virtue on my 
part, but my having or not having a skill does not say anything about my character. 
 The other difference that is closely related to the first is that “skills are fundamentally a 
kind of competence” (Baehr 2011, 30). What he means by this is that skills can be compared to a 
final product, while intellectual virtues are more comparable to a process. He gives the example 
of a scientist who engages in very diligent, careful research, but merely for the purpose of 
gaining money and professional status (Baehr 2011, 30). While we might have admiration for the 
scientist’s professional skill, most would agree that his character falls short of demonstrating 
intellectual virtue. Intellectual virtues involve pursuing knowledge for more than things like 
monetary gain. One does not need to be born with exceptional skills or faculties to be 
intellectually virtuous, but rather she must nurture the talents she has in pursuit of a higher goal.  
I have spent time talking about what intellectual virtues are not, as well as behaviors that 
are intellectually virtuous, but before I go on to argue that Christian beliefs are consistent with 
intellectual virtues, I must give a more explicit explanation of what intellectual virtues actually 
are. The key to understanding intellectual virtue lies in Baehr’s discussion of personal worth. In 
simplified terms, Baehr’s concept of personal intellectual worth is how good or bad someone is 
in the intellectual realm. By this, I do not mean how intelligent or unintelligent someone is, but 
rather, how one pursues intellectual good or bad. As Baehr says, “Indeed, someone might 
possess perfect vision, a photographic memory, and an extraordinarily high IQ, while still being 
a deeply flawed or vicious person” (Baehr 2011, 93). Possessing advanced faculties and skills is 
not what makes one an intellectually good person. He lays out what specifically makes one 
intellectually virtuous with his formal definition of the basis of personal intellectual worth 
(BIW) which is as follows: 
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  “A subject S is intellectually good or better qua person to the extent that S is positively 
oriented toward or “loves” what is intellectually good and is negatively oriented toward or 
“hates” what is intellectually bad” (Baehr 2011, 101).  
What determines whether someone is an intellectually good person is whether someone 
embraces the practices and mindsets that are conducive to knowledge and spurns the things that 
would hinder knowledge. Returning to the example of Frederick Douglass, what made him such 
a profoundly intellectually good person is not his IQ or reasoning skills (although presumably he 
did excel in both these categories), but rather it was his undying love of knowledge, and his 
willingness to push through any hindrance to that knowledge.  
Baehr finishes his account by tying together all the pieces he discussed in his definition 
of intellectual virtues. He says, “an intellectual virtue is a character trait that contributes to its 
possessor’s personal intellectual worth on account of its involving a positive psychological 
orientation towards epistemic goods” (Baehr 2011, 102). A person who is intellectually virtuous 
loves epistemic good, and an intellectual virtue is any characteristic in that person that orients 
them towards that epistemic good. Frederick Douglass loved knowledge, and he had a tenacity in 
pursuing it. These traits oriented him towards epistemic good, and therefore, they qualify as 
intellectual virtues. 
 Now that I have laid out a broad view of intellectual virtues, I will argue that Christian 
beliefs are compatible with intellectual virtues. Before I do this, I want to make a clarifying 
comment about my explication of Baehr. Baehr puts a lot of focus in his book on the role of 
epistemic virtue in epistemology and how it fits into an analysis of knowledge. This discussion is 
not particularly helpful for the purpose of paper, so I will not include it, but I wish to make a 
point about intellectual virtues. Whether or not intellectual virtues have any role in the formal 
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definition of knowledge, everyone can agree that they do play a role in gaining knowledge. It is 
possible that one could be the Forrest Gump of epistemology who always, by coincidence, ends 
up in the right place to gain knowledge. But this is an unlikely scenario and not one that is 
important to consider, so even if intellectual virtue has no place in a definition of knowledge, it is 
safe to say that it helps us gain knowledge, which is a very good thing. Now I will delve into 
some of the some of the evidential factors that contribute to the justification of Christian beliefs.  
III. Religious Experience 
There is a strong case to be made that one can be justified in her Christian beliefs as a 
result of evidential factors. When talking about the justification of Christian beliefs, people can 
be quick to jump to purely rational arguments for or against the existence of God, but for the 
purposes of this paper I want to focus on the place of experience in justifying Christian belief. 
Although, in philosophy, experience is not typically the first piece of evidence we turn to in 
order to prove something, it is a very valuable piece of evidence that informs many of our beliefs 
in everyday life. For example, we do not typically believe that an external world exists based on 
purely rational arguments, but rather because we experience it existing. Perhaps we can have our 
belief in the external world bolstered by rational argument, but that argument comes after we 
believe in the external world by experience. Experience is essential for understanding the world 
around us and should never be undervalued.  
But how does all this relate to religious beliefs? I will begin by arguing that people can be 
justified in holding religious beliefs, in part, based on experience. Borrowing from William 
Alston, I will defend why religious experience should be considered strong evidence for religious 
beliefs. Even though many people may have different religious experiences, I believe that 
religious experience can form part of a rational basis for religious beliefs.  
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 One major objection to Christian beliefs is that there is not enough evidence to believe in 
God. As W.K. Clifford put it, “To sum up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to 
believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (Clifford 1879, 168). And since there is not enough 
evidence to establish a belief in God, say because of the problem of evil or other such evidence 
against Christian beliefs, it would be wrong for one to believe in God. In short, there is not 
enough evidence for God’s existence, so we should not believe it.  There are two aspects in 
which this conclusion is incorrect. First, there are good evidential reasons to believe Christianity, 
and secondly, it makes the incorrect assumption that evidence is the only thing needed for 
epistemic justification.  
 Many deny that religious experience could be sufficient evidence to rationally accept a 
belief in God. They would argue that religious experience is completely subjective, and therefore 
unable to firmly establish any religious beliefs, but this is not a proper understanding of religious 
experience. Before I proceed to argue for the epistemic value of religious experience, I will first 
clarify what I mean by it. William Alston defines religious experience as manifestations of 
“God’s nature and activities… in our lives” (Alston 1983, 105). By this he does not mean visions 
of God or other “sensory hallucinations” but rather experiences like feeling God’s forgiveness 
and being freed from the weight of one’s sins or feeling God’s divine providence and care in 
one’s life (Alston 1983, 104-105).  In short, religious experience is any sort of everyday 
experience that communicates to an individual, one or many attributes of God. These 
experiences tend to give us greater confidence or assurance that a personal God who is interested 
in our individual lives exists. But is it rational to use these experiences as evidence for the 
existence of God? Many people never experience any sort of divine presence in their lives. 
Others have had experiences that have caused them to believe firmly that God does not exist.   
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 The first important point regarding this question is the importance of experience in our 
daily lives. If we think back to the question of whether or not the external world exists, we are 
justified in believing that the world exists without any purely rational arguments. Perhaps, like in 
Descartes’ thought experiment, it would be a valuable exercise for us to doubt everything in 
order to find what the one thing we could not doubt is, but in a normal context, it is rational for 
us to trust our sense experience. And this trust needs no deep, rational justification. It would not 
be correct to say that only people who have thought deeply about the justification for following 
their senses are rational. Saying this would raise our standards for what we view as a justified 
belief to an unreasonable level. We do not need to be sure of something beyond the point of any 
doubt to be justified in believing it. Our senses, while they can be mistaken, are typically quite 
reliable, and are strong enough evidence to provide us with justification. They are central to who 
we are, and we are justified in trusting them.  
But ultimately, most people do not doubt the value of our senses. The reason people tend 
to trust the physical experience of others over others’ religious experience is that physical 
experience tends to be corroborated by everyone around us. Imagine Bob, a devoutly religious 
Christian, is crossing a busy street and forgets to check his left side before he walks out onto the 
street. Right as he takes his first step a car zooms right in front of him, where his next step would 
have been. Bob obviously witnesses the car zooming by, but he also experiences God’s kind 
providence in sparing his life. The people in the street at the time who witness the event will all 
agree with Bob that he was almost hit by a car, but not all will agree that what they had just 
witnessed was divine providence. This is a simple example, but one that illustrates the point that 
sensory experience is corroborated in a way that religious experience is not. But does this 
discrepancy disqualify religious experience as evidence for our religious beliefs? I believe that it 
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does not. Our sense of the world around us is our main connection to reality, and therefore, it 
should take a lot of evidence for us to doubt our senses. This is not to say our senses cannot 
deceive us. Anything from a hallucination to a false sense of divine providence and intervention 
could cause one to be in error, but this does not mean that we should be skeptical of our senses 
unless whatever we experience is confirmed by others. Imagine if Adam were to just wake up on 
an uninhabited earth, fully conscious, but alone. He would undoubtedly believe the world he 
sensed around him was real, and since no one else exists in this scenario, there would be no way 
to decipher whether his sense of the physical world was a consensus building one.  
We are rational to default to trusting our senses, but how should we respond when our 
experience is not confirmed? Let us return to the example of Adam to answer this question. Say a 
few more people have come into existence on the earth. One day Adam is observing a tree and 
makes a passing remark about it to one of his new friends. The friend, Eve, is confused, and says 
that she is positive she is looking at a rock. A few more friends come by and take Eve’s side, all 
positive that they are looking at a rock3.Even in this case, Adam would still be justified in 
believing that he was observing a tree. The fact that the perceptions of others are not in line with 
his own is not good enough of a reason for him to abandon his belief that he is staring at a tree. 
He should most certainly be more skeptical of his own senses as a result of his disagreement, but 
his perception of a tree in front of him is still very good evidence that there is, in fact, a tree in 
front of him. And the same can be said of religious experience. The fact that many do not share 
one’s experiences does not mean that those experiences are not compelling evidence for one’s 
religious beliefs. As Alston puts it, “By virtue of having the experience the subject is in a 
position such that she will be adequately justified in the belief unless there are strong reasons to 
 
3 For the sake of the example, let us imagine that this is not simply a language issue that is simply causes by Adam 
and Eve have different words to denote the same thing.  
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the contrary, unless there are defeaters of sufficient strength” (Alston 1983, 112). Religious 
experience is strong evidence for one’s religious beliefs, but it is insufficient for a robust 
justification of Christians belief. While I do believe there is other evidence for them, a full 
account of justifying Christian beliefs includes pragmatic factors. It is tempting, even for those 
who hold religious beliefs, to resort to a purely evidential view of justification. Before I go on to 
explain why I think this is incorrect, I will first explain the evidentialist thesis.  
Evidentialism can be summarized by David Hume’s phrase, “A wise man proportions his 
beliefs to the evidence”. The idea conveyed by this quote is that beliefs are only as justified as 
they are supported by evidence. So if one has a large amount of evidence supporting a given 
proposition, he is justified in having a large amount of confidence in that proposition, but if one 
has a small amount of evidence for a given proposition, he is only justified in having a small 
amount of confidence in that proposition, perhaps not even enough for belief. There are different 
variations of this evidentialist thesis, but they all share the same basic idea that a belief is only 
fully justified based on evidence.  
 This evidentialist thesis seems quite intuitive, and there are many valuable lessons that 
we can gain from it. For example, it is important to always keep in mind that evidence is a key 
factor in establishing any belief. We live at a time where “alternative facts” and “fake news” are 
readily available to us through social media, and so now more than ever we should emphasize 
the importance of real evidence and not having baseless, potentially harmful beliefs. But this 
does not mean that evidence is the only factor involved in justifying beliefs. In fact, the 
evidentialist thesis requires that we build our beliefs on more than evidence. Evidentialism states 
that all our beliefs should be based on evidence, but why should we accept evidentialism? What 
is the evidence for that proposition? There must be some non-evidential reason why we would 
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accept evidentialism in the first place, which would be fine, if it were not for the claims of 
evidentialism. We need factors beyond evidence to justify our beliefs, the question is, “What 
should these other factors be?”. Throughout the rest of this paper, I will bring up some of these 
factors, and show how they contribute to justifying Christian belief.  
IV. Intellectual Loyalty 
The idea of intellectual loyalty4 is introduced in Sarah Stroud’s paper “Epistemic 
Partiality in Friendship”. The primary example that she uses to illustrate this point has to do with 
a third party making an accusation against one’s friend. Stroud imagines an example where 
someone accuses your friend Sam of sleeping with someone and then never returning her calls. 
In the example, this is totally new information to you and you do not actually know whether it is 
true (Stroud 2006, 504). So, what should a good friend do in this situation? Stroud says that a 
good friend would believe the best of Sam, but not because of evidential factors. Rather, she says 
that we should believe the best of our friends because esteem and commitment are integral to 
friendship. She says, “...friendship is in some important sense based on your friend’s character 
and on esteem for his merits” (Stroud 2006, 511). Since this is the case, we can safely say that 
esteeming your friend’s character is an important element of friendship. Stroud is saying that 
there are reasons for belief that are not epistemic, but rather are based on our interpersonal 
connections and commitments. Stroud brings up the idea that there are non-epistemic reasons for 
beliefs, but Allan Hazlett expands on it. 
He says in his paper, “I shall understand intellectual loyalty as loyalty in the intellectual 
domain, where this comprises the (individual or collective) generation and sharing of 
information, and the practices and institutions that sustain and regulate these in a society” 
 
4 Stroud does not use this exact term but the concept she talks about is the same  
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(Hazlett 2016, 328). Intellectual loyalty is the loyalty that we have to certain people or 
institutions that shapes the way we gather and process information. So, if we have some sort of 
intellectual loyalty to our family or friends, the beliefs that we form about them will be heavily 
influenced by the loyalty that we feel towards them. The example that Hazlett uses to illustrate 
this idea of intellectual loyalty has to do with loyalty to a community. He uses the example of the 
murder of Ruben Salazar during riots in East Los Angeles in 1970. He discusses the differing 
views of Oscar Acosta and Hunter Thompson based on the evidence of the case. Both of the men 
thought it was a murder that the L.A. Police department was responsible for, but they had 
differing views on the motivation of the killing. Acosta, who was a Chicago lawyer, believed that 
it was a conspiracy in the L.A. Police Department to kill off Salazar because of the criticism he 
had leveled towards the department. He was sure that it was a conspiracy in order to silence a 
voice that had spoken out against corruption. On the other hand, Thompson thought that the 
murder was just the result of the “half-mad stupidity and dangerous incompetence on every level 
of the law enforcement establishment” (Hazlett 2016, 329). Hazlett argues that the reason for 
Acosta’s insistence that the murder was part of a conspiracy was guided by his intellectual 
loyalty to the Chicano community.  
This example is very helpful in illustrating what is meant by intellectual loyalty because 
it is not that one just blindly follows the community they are intellectually loyal to. Rather, when 
one reasons and processes the facts in a given circumstance, that process is affected by one’s 
loyalties. Thompson and Acosta both viewed the same evidence in this case and both ended up 
with reasonable conclusions based on that evidence, but Acosta’s conclusions were shaped by his 
intellectual loyalty to the Chicano community. Hazlett says, “I don’t mean to suggest that, in 
such cases, you take yourself to believe on the basis of emotional considerations—these would 
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be the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ for belief” (Hazlett 2016, 334). Intellectual loyalties do not just 
generate certain beliefs in us. Rather, they direct our process of belief forming.  
Hazlett builds on the concept of intellectual loyalty by discussing three different ideas 
that are essential to it. The first idea is that “just as loyalty can make certain courses of action 
unthinkable for a person, loyalty can make certain doxastic attitudes unthinkable for a person” 
(Hazlett 2016, 331). What this means is that when we are loyal to someone or something, there 
are some attitudes towards them that we could not take. Hazlett goes on to say that it is a 
necessity that we have certain attitudes based on our relational attachments. He says, “The 
necessity is not logical or metaphysical; it is akin to the necessity of moral obligation” (Hazlett 
2016, 331). One clear example of this idea is found in Kanye West’s song Family Business. In 
the song Kanye says, addressing a relative, “Who knew I’d have to look at you through a glass? 
And look, you tell me you ain’t did it then you ain’t did it…”. Kanye is telling his imprisoned 
relative that in spite of the evidence of the relative having committed a crime (e.g. his arrest and 
conviction of a crime), he will choose to believe what the relative says because of the family 
bond that the two share.  Perhaps as in this case, it is unthinkable that I would believe that 
someone in my family would commit a felony and then lie to me about it. This analogy works 
quite well because it is commonly accepted that there are behaviors that one would avoid 
because of loyalties to a certain community, so it makes sense that there are certain doxastic 
attitudes that one avoid because of intellectual loyalties. The second idea that Hazlett brings up is 
“loyalty can lead you to refuse to believe something” (Hazlett 2016, 332). There can be things 
that would be so damaging for us to believe as people with intellectual loyalties that we can 
refuse to believe it. Again, this does not mean that we believe something because we want it to 
be true. I cannot just think to myself, “I want it to be the case that my parents would never lie to 
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me” and believe that to be true on the basis of that evidence. Rather, I will not think it true that 
my parents have lied to me because that would be so damaging. Of course, in the face of 
overwhelming evidence I would be forced to believe something I had previously refused to 
believe, but in the absence of evidence, my refusal will stand. The final idea that Hazlett presents 
is that “there are hinges of loyalty” (Hazlett 2016, 334). What Hazlett means by a hinge is that 
there are things that we are forced to believe as a result of being loyal to a certain group. He says 
that when all other “doxastic alternatives” are unthinkable to one, there is something that we are 
forced to believe. He continues, “When such necessities manifest loyalty, we can speak of hinges 
of loyalty, i.e., cases in which you are required to believe that p in virtue of your loyalty to 
someone or something” (Hazlett 216, 335). There are times when because of loyalties we are 
forced to accept a proposition that would not be apparent to one without those loyalties but are 
acceptable for one with them.  
To illustrate these three ideas, Hazlett applies them to the example he uses in the 
beginning of the paper. He says, 
 We can easily imagine that it is unthinkable for Acosta to believe that Salazar was not 
assassinated—so believing would amount to a betrayal of the community for whom 
Salazar is a martyr. And we can easily imagine that he refuses to believe the 
establishment line—that Salazar’s death was an accident. Finally, we can see how Acosta 
is required to believe that Salazar was assassinated, in virtue of his loyalty to the Chicano 
community (Hazlett 2016, 336). 
An important point to note in Both Hazlett’s and Stroud’s writing is that neither of them condone 
completely cutting oneself off from negative information regarding one we feel intellectual 
Bonsell 17 
 
loyalty towards. Rather, we have a bias towards those people that affects how we process new 
information about them, but we must always pursue the truth about the people we are loyal to.  
To return to Stroud’s example of beliefs about your friend, she also points out that, 
regarding friendship, “Your friend need not prove each day, from scratch, that he is a good 
person” (Stroud 2006, 512). In other words, your friend should be innocent until proven guilty in 
your eyes if his character is attacked. Cases involving friendship are fundamentally different 
from other cases in our day to day lives of belief forming. Say for example, a stranger tells you 
in casual conversation that the New England Patriots lost to the Baltimore Ravens on Sunday 
night. You know that there exists a National Football League and that the Patriots and the 
Ravens are both teams in that league, but that is the extent of your football knowledge. In this 
case, it would make no sense for you to doubt what the stranger had said. But if the stranger said 
that your friend had done something morally wrong, you would be right to doubt him because 
you have a relationship to your friend while you are totally disconnected from the NFL (and even 
if you were, say, a Patriots fan, it would be difficult to argue there are any morally binding duties 
that one has to the sports team he roots for). According to Stroud, friendship entails epistemic 
demands that seemingly contradict the demands of most orthodox theories of epistemic 
rationality.  
 But many philosophers dispute that this seeming tension exists. One objection that Stroud 
brings up is that “One could argue that the good friend is merely applying general, impartial 
epistemological principles to  the  processing  of  new  information  about  her  friends,  and  that  
the conclusions she draws are in fact fully justified” (Stroud 2006, 515). Someone who makes 
this objection argues that when one has a friend, she will have a lot of information about this 
friend. She will have presumably spent a lot of time with her friend and has gotten to know the 
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friend on a deep level, so she has a lot of evidence which allows her to stand up for her friend’s 
character when it is attacked. There can also be cases of differential information. Perhaps in the 
example with Sam being accused of sleeping with someone and never answering her calls, you 
happen to know that Sam lost his phone in an Uber that night and was not intentionally being 
hurtful. This idea that one might be epistemically justified in believing the best of her friends 
because of the large amount of evidence she has certainly works in some situations, but it does 
not disprove the point that Stroud makes. Imagine the example with Sam where you have no 
differential information. If your coworker accuses Sam of sleeping with a girl and then cutting 
off all communication, you might say that you know Sam well enough to know that he would not 
do that, but this is not in accordance with evidentialist principles. How could you know that Sam 
wouldn’t do something like that? Perhaps he decided he had been strait-laced for long enough 
and he wanted to cut loose, or that, unbeknownst to you, some tragedy had happened in his life 
and his way of coping was living without restraint. Even though we might have a lot of evidence 
regarding our friends’ characters, this does not mean that we can know what they would do at 
any given moment, and so from a purely evidentialist standpoint, one would not be able to 
believe the best of her friend in a scenario like that involving Sam. In fact, from an evidentialist 
standpoint in the absence of differential evidence, the best we can hope to do is suspend belief 
regarding our friend’s actions until we get more evidence. But as I have already discussed, being 
a good friend involves sticking up for one’s friends and believing the best of them at times when 
their character is attacked.  
Before I go on to connect this discussion to religious beliefs, I want to reiterate a caveat 
that Stroud brings up in her paper that I mentioned earlier. She says that the epistemic bias that 
we have towards our friends is not an absolute refusal to believe any wrong about them (Stroud 
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2006, 513). It is not that we refuse to believe anything negative about our friends’ characters, but 
it should take more evidence to make us think ill of our friends. While the norms of friendship 
may sometimes clash with the norms of evidentialism, we need not fear we must be bad 
believers in order to be good friends. Although we should be more reluctant to form negative 
beliefs about our friends, we must never shut ourselves off from the truth about them. What cases 
like these ones show is that evidentialism is an insufficient epistemic theory. It is not as though 
we have two options which are evidentialism or believing whatever we want regardless of the 
evidence. The majority of the cases in our everyday lives we should apply evidentialist 
principles, but as we see in the case of friendship, they are not sufficient for every circumstance. 
Believing despite evidentialist principles can at times help us to be better friends and, I will 
argue, better believers.  
I have argued up to this point that friendship involves certain epistemic practices that are 
not in accordance with evidentialism, I will now argue that Christianity involves similar 
obligations. While it may seem like religious beliefs just involve affirming a given hypothesis 
like “God exists”, in many cases, there is much more involved than merely affirming a 
proposition. For many people it involves being an active member of a faith community, which 
can entail hours of community involvement and service each week. Relationships, career 
choices, and lifestyle choices can all change radically when one ascribes to a religion. My 
personal belief is that one who follows the teachings of Jesus has a personal relationship with 
God, but one does not need to accept this to see that, say, being a Christian is in some ways 
analogous to being in a friendship, as far as the commitment.  
Alvin Plantinga makes a point very similar to this one in one of his arguments against 
evidentialism. He says,  
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“If my belief in God is based on argument, then if I am to be properly rational, 
epistemically responsible, I shall have to keep checking the philosophical journals to see 
whether, say, Anthony Flew has finally come up with an objection to my favorite 
argument. This could be bothersome and time-consuming; and what do I do if someone 
finds a flaw in my argument? Stop going to church? … [this] is like believing in the 
existence of your spouse on the basis of the analogical argument for other minds” 
(Plantinga 1983, 67). 
Plantinga’s point is that there is so much that is entailed in a religious life that it would be absurd 
for one’s religious beliefs to require constant reaffirmation through argument. At some point we 
must commit to our religious beliefs and they must be the starting point for us when we look at 
given pieces of evidence. Now this does not mean that we should blindly commit to our religious 
beliefs. Just like in the case of friendship, one does not blindly think the best of her friend, but 
rather, she gives her friend a privileged status. If someone accuses her friend of lacking 
character, she will do all she can to defend her friend’s character in the moment, but this is not 
where her research will end. She must figure out whether the report about her friend was true, 
and if it was what the explanation was. In the same way, if someone who is a Christian learns 
about some argument for atheism that he cannot disprove, it would be rational for him to not 
drop his beliefs on the spot. He would be justified in holding his beliefs despite the evidence 
because of the relational nature of religious beliefs. While I do not believe someone in this 
position would be forced to suspend or change his beliefs, he would be bound to pursue this 
evidence with an open mind to see where the evidence led him. We should be open to new 
evidence and to following it to where it leads, but to effectively do this, we must have some sort 
of stable, foundational beliefs that we can rest on. 
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 While I am arguing here that in some situations we can be justified in our religious 
beliefs despite evidence against them, I will contend that this will ultimately help us form better 
beliefs. Imagine someone whose entire life revolves around his faith. This entails hours spent at 
his church, whether it be at Bible studies or different charitable endeavors, as well as his personal 
spiritual rhythms, say, reading the Bible and praying before he wakes up and goes to sleep. If he 
was duty bound to drop all his beliefs every time he saw a new argument against his religion, he 
would be too scared to ever look into any challenges of his beliefs because it would completely 
disrupt his life. While it could be argued that this would be unhealthy psychologically, it is also 
easy to see how this would harm one’s epistemic pursuits. As someone who was raised in the 
church, I have been asked many times if I think it is unwise to study philosophy. The idea is that 
I should fear studying philosophy because as I see arguments against what I believe, this will 
inevitably weaken my faith. Now this is an extreme example, but I think it is helpful in 
illustrating the point that having a doxastic slant towards our religious beliefs can provide a 
safety net that may make us more inclined to explore new ideas, and eventually come to more 
informed opinions. So, while I am arguing that we should hold to our religious beliefs at some 
times for non-evidential reasons, I think this system can ultimately lead us to a superior 
epistemic status. 
It is important to note that in this section I am not addressing how we decide what 
religious beliefs to accept initially. Rather, I have been describing how we should process new 
evidence once we have already established our beliefs. Having this commitment to our already 
established beliefs in the realm of religion may seem intellectually dishonest and unconducive to 
new beliefs, but the case is quite the opposite. It allows for a healthy platform from which to 
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challenge one’s own beliefs and ultimately have a more rigorous process by which to form 
beliefs.  
The claim that a belief in God that is held with epistemic bias can make us more open-
minded people who engage with many different views may seem absurd on the surface. How 
could cutting oneself off from considering evidence that undermines one’s own belief possibly 
make you more open-minded? I want to begin by defining what it means to be open-minded. 
Baehr defines the open-minded person as such: “An open-minded person is characteristically (a) 
willing and (within limits) able (b) to transcend a default cognitive standpoint (c) in order to take 
up or take seriously the merits of (d) a distinct cognitive standpoint” (Baehr 2011, 152). Baehr is 
saying that an open-minded person will take views other than her own seriously; she will 
seriously engage with other views because she has a strong desire to know the truth. One who is 
open-minded does not merely examine views that she disagrees with in order “to know what the 
other side believes”, but she does it in a genuine pursuit of the truth. But if this is what it is to be 
open-minded, how can one be open-minded if she has an epistemic bias towards her own beliefs? 
I believe that this can happen because it is possible to seriously consider other beliefs while 
having a strong epistemic bias towards one’s own beliefs.  
The first thing we must remember when considering open-mindedness, is the importance 
of our beliefs. Some beliefs that we have are not at all essential to our identity. I believe that Des 
Moines is the capital of Iowa, but this belief does not in any way contribute to my identity. It is a 
fact that I accept, but my holding this belief does not have any meaningful role in my identity. 
But there are other beliefs that are critical to one’s identity and give meaning to one’s life. The 
example I am focusing on in this paper is a belief in God. One example of this meaning making 
belief is the faith seen in the British philosopher C.S. Lewis. Lewis famously said, “I believe in 
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Christianity as I believe that the sun has risen: not only because I see it, but because by it I see 
everything else”. For Lewis, Christianity was not merely some proposition that he held from an 
intellectual standpoint, but it was a belief that was central to his identity. Beliefs like this are 
very important in providing us with meaning in life, as well as stability. And these beliefs are not 
necessarily religious in nature. For some it might be the belief that one’s spouse is his soulmate, 
or perhaps it is the belief in a political ideology, or something of that sort. While we should be 
open to new evidence and believing what is true rather than what we merely want to believe, 
these central beliefs should be held with a certain tenacity that other beliefs are not. These beliefs 
are so central to our identity and stability that it should take more evidence for me to reject them 
than it should for me to change my belief on the capital city of a state.  
We have established that it is both important to have a strong grasp on our identity 
defining beliefs, but also that it is important to cultivate the intellectual virtue of open-
mindedness. I believe that although epistemic bias (specifically towards Christianity) may seem 
to be opposed to open-mindedness on the surface, in reality, the two can go very much hand-in-
hand. The reason for this is the stability that epistemic bias provides. If my Christian faith is at 
the core of my very being, rejecting that faith will be something that terrifies me. Perhaps I can 
say with the Apostle Peter as he addresses Jesus, “Lord, to whom shall we go? You have the 
words of life…” (John 6:68, ESV). If I am afraid that every bit of contrary evidence, I see will 
shatter my faith, or force me to stop believing in Christianity, I will be afraid to seek out ideas 
that differ from my own. And we cannot just condemn this as vicious behavior. If my beliefs are 
central to my identity, I am looking out for my own good when I try to avoid having them done 
away with. Perhaps this would not be the most intellectually virtuous move on my part, but I 
would take psychological stability over being deemed intellectually virtuous any day.  
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But we need not choose between personal stability and open-mindedness. As I said in the 
last section, even the beliefs that we hold with bias must be subject to scrutiny. While I can be 
epistemically partial towards my Christian beliefs, this does not mean that they are immune from 
evidential inquiry. It is wrong to stubbornly hold on to a belief after it has been shown to be 
false. If you eventually find that your views are misinformed, you should give those misinformed 
views up. Epistemic partiality is not synonymous with irrationality, but rather, it provides a safe 
foundation from which one can explore other ideas. I have the freedom to truly engage with, for 
example, atheist arguments against Christianity because I do not have to fear my identity 
crumbling at the first piece of evidence I see. Approaching evidence this way is intellectually 
virtuous, but also more psychologically healthy. I have met people who live very bitter lives 
because their faith was “stolen” from them. What usually has happened in cases like these is that 
the person had very strong views that they protected from any sort of challenges. One might 
think that his faith (along with every specific view he has under the umbrella of faith) is perfectly 
accounted for by the evidence, while simultaneously avoiding the views of people he disagrees 
with because they will only “lead him astray”. Some people can go their whole lives like this, but 
others inevitably experience arguments from the other side, and feel as though they can no longer 
believe Christianity once they are exposed to those arguments. This is not an easy process to 
undergo, and many people feel betrayed as a result. 
But, if I can explore other ideas without the fear of my faith being completely 
undermined the first time I see evidence against my beliefs, I can study with an open mind and 
truly engage with those arguments. And if over time my faith is undermined, because perhaps in 
truly engaging with the other side I find my currently held beliefs to be false, then I have been 
broken into my new beliefs, in a manner of speaking. The rug was not ripped out from under my 
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feet, but rather, I gradually stepped off it. A Christian can be open-minded and explore the views 
of others because she does not have to fear the beliefs that define her being taken away all at 
once. Perhaps if, later on in life, she finds that her views were false, she can say that she no 
longer agrees with Peter and that there are no other places for her to go outside of Christianity. 
And Christian doctrine is clear that we should find something else to believe if Christianity is 
false. In his letter to the Corinthians, the Apostle Paul says that if Jesus did not actually resurrect 
and the things he said about himself were false, “we [Christians] are of all people most to be 
pitied” (1 Corinthians 15:19 ESV). Christians are told in the Bible to abandon their beliefs if they 
are not true.  
Now there is obvious tension here. As a Christian I can be open-minded, but I should also 
show epistemic partiality towards my belief in God. In practice, this is not an easy thing to do. 
We can vacillate between closing our minds off to the people we disagree with and giving too 
much weight to insignificant evidence against our beliefs without spending the time to truly 
process that evidence. But this is a healthy tension that we should live in. There should be 
nuance to our doxastic practices and the beliefs that are integral to our identity. And because of 
this tension, one can strongly hold to Christian beliefs while also cultivating the intellectual 
virtue of open-mindedness.  
V. Hope  
         As I have established earlier in this paper, there are reasons to believe beyond just 
evidential ones. In this section of my paper I will argue that the hope that Christian beliefs 
provide contribute to their justification. I will begin by explaining the nature of Christian Hope, 
largely borrowing from Anne Jeffrey’s work on the subject. After I have explained what 
constitutes Christian Hope, I will compare the Christian account of hope to other accounts, 
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particularly those of Sharon Ryan and Miriam McCormick. Finally, I will expand on some 
examples of Christian Hope from both scriptures and more modern examples and argue that they 
are consistent with modern accounts of justified hope. 
         In her paper “Hope in Christianity”, Anne Jeffrey lays out an interpretation of 
 the idea of hope as is presented in Christian Doctrine. The term “hope” is commonly used in 
casual conversation as something synonymous to simply wishing, but the term is much more full 
of meaning in Christian doctrine. Christian hope is multifaceted, including hope for certain 
positive outcomes in the future, as well as hope in the personal God who is at the center of the 
whole belief system. To explain the Christian view of hope, Jeffrey begins by discussing the 
objects of Christian hope. She divides the object of hope into two main categories: objectual and 
interpersonal. Interpersonal is hope in another person, rather than a specific outcome. The main 
object of this interpersonal hope is God, who is the center of all Christian belief. When Jeffrey 
discusses this idea she says, “We see this most pronounced where theologians discuss the norms 
of hope… For they argue that hope in Christ or in God must be primary and prior to hope for the 
various goods God might offer. Love of God and faith or trust in God should issue in hope in 
God” (Jeffrey 2019, 38-39). A Christian is not supposed to merely hope for a specific outcome in 
his life, but he is supposed to put his hope in God. While it is legitimate to hope for a certain 
outcome, that is not the center of Christian belief. For example, I can hope that Christianity will 
offer me structure, community and meaning in my life that I greatly desire, but the point of 
Christianity is not merely those ends. Christianity tells us to have faith and hope in the person of 
God. We must hope in God rather than using him as a means to the ends we desire. He must be 
the primary object of our hope, from one’s hope in him springs the other hopes we have. 
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         Adrienne Martin discusses the idea of “hoping in” another in her book “How We Hope” 
and she calls this a kind of hope  “normative hope”. This is when we engage with a person as 
someone with reasoning abilities. Martin says, “When we relate to someone interpersonally, we 
treat her as a reasoner”. Martin then goes on to expand on what this means when she says, “To 
relate to someone as a reasoner is not just to treat her in a way that relies on her capacity to 
reason, but also to stand ready to exchange reasons with her…” (Martin 2014, 122). When we 
have normative hope, we do not merely hope for some outcome, but we place our hope in a 
person, a rational agent, who we engage with and have expectations of. Of course, when talking 
about God, the situation does not exactly match talking about interacting with another person. 
For one thing, even if one believes that God is active and listening to our prayers, the way we 
interact with God is quite different from the way we interact with other people. For one thing, we 
cannot casually have a two-way conversation with God where we understand exactly what he is 
trying to say. But there are also ways in which our relationship to God is analogous to another 
person. For a Christian, God is not just a genie who is there to fulfil our wishes. He is not just 
some potential for us to have a better outcome. He is meant to be someone that we love and 
follow. He is meant to be engaged with. This is why our hope in him is interpersonal hope. 
Martin says, “Normative hope involves a stance taken towards the capacities and/or situation of 
the agent about whom one hopes” (Martin 2014, 130). Our hope as Christians is not merely a 
hope in an outcome. It is a hope in the God who we also trust will bring about those outcomes. 
We primarily hope in him because of who he is. But the other facet of hope is the hope in the 
outcomes we believe that God will bring about. 
This kind of hope we see in Christianity is characterized by Jeffrey as objectual hope. 
This is hope that is considered secondary to the interpersonal hope in God. This includes things 
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like hope for salvation and the second coming of Jesus where he will restore God’s kingdom on 
this earth, but also more mundane things like personal connections based on a shared love of 
God (Jeffrey 2019, 39). One verse in the New Testament that encapsulates both the extraordinary 
and mundane objects of hope is found in the Gospel of Mark. This quote of Jesus comes after 
much heavy teaching on the cost of discipleship in an attempt to show the apostles that although 
there will be costs to following him, it will be worth it. The passage goes as follows: “Jesus said, 
‘Truly, I say to you, there is no one who has left house or brothers or sisters or mother or father 
or children or lands, for my sake and for the gospel, who will not receive a hundredfold now in 
this time, houses and brothers and sisters and mothers and children and lands, with persecutions, 
and in the age to come eternal life’” (Mark 10:29-30, ESV). In this passage Jesus is telling his 
disciples that although they might lose friends and family over their commitment to him, they 
will not only receive eternal life (the extraordinary promise), but they will also receive “houses 
and brothers and sisters and mothers...” which is commonly understood as being a promise of 
Christian community. 
 So far we have seen that Christian Hope includes both interpersonal hope in the personal 
God of the Bible, as well as objectual hope of God bringing about certain desirable outcomes, 
but there are still some more nuances to capture before I move on. The first unique aspect of 
Christian hope that I will highlight is its connection to faith. According to Christian belief, hope 
requires some level of confidence. Hope is not a disposition that one can develop without any 
belief that what is hoped for will actually come about. For this reason, Jeffrey claims that 
Christian hope must be preceded by faith (Jeffrey 2019, 44). One must have faith in God that he 
is real, caring, loving, and that he has a plan for one’s life, even when one cannot see that plan. 
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Jeffrey adds an extended quote from the theologian Jurgen Moltmann that discusses the 
relationship between hope and faith. Moltmann says, 
“Faith is the foundation upon which hope rests, hope nourishes and sustains faith. For as 
no one except him who already believes His promises can look for anything from God, so 
again the weakness of our faith must be sustained and nourished by patient hope and 
expectation, let it fail and grow faint. . . Faith in Christ gives hope its assurance” 
(Moltmann 1993, 22). 
Christian hope requires one to believe that an outcome that cannot be seen will truly be brought 
about, and since we cannot see that outcome in the present, it requires faith in God. There would 
be no basis for hope if we did not have faith. This is the reason why Jeffrey can say, “The 
Christian view claims that hope excludes knowledge and that hope involves certainty, 
simultaneously” (Jeffrey 2019, 44). I believe that Jeffrey overstates the Christian hope when she 
says it involves certainty. This would put an unrealistic expectation on all those who hope. Even 
if one has unmistakably experienced God in his life, there will be many times when it seems that 
there are many reasons to doubt that God will really help him or will follow out on his promises. 
The Psalms are full of instances of the psalm writer expressing doubts in God and the promises 
of God. But there is also a balance. Hope is not merely a disposition that requires no belief 
whatsoever. There still must be a certain level of faith in God for one to truly have hope in a 
Christian framework. 
Before I continue in my discussion of hope I must first draw a distinction between hope, 
faith, and belief. Sometimes these terms are treated as interchangeable because of their similar 
definitions, but the terms all have important distinctions. Belief very generally involves mentally 
affirming a proposition, but there are many things that I believe that I do not have any hope or 
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faith in. I believe that there are fifty states in the U.S., but that is just a fact that I affirm. I have 
no special relationship to this belief. It is something I affirm, but there are no special obligations 
entailed by this belief. This is one of the main distinctions between faith and belief. Faith is not 
the mere affirmation of a proposition. Faith is rooted in belief, but it entails obligation and 
action. In James’ epistle, the author clearly makes this point in talking to his audience when he 
says, “You believe that God is one; you do well. Even the demons believe—and shudder!” 
(James 2:19, ESV). What James is saying in the context of the letter is that merely affirming 
propositions regarding God is not enough. One must not just believe that God is good, but he 
must trust God and he must love God. So, while we can say that faith is based on the affirmation 
of certain propositions, that is only a part of it. There are also actions like love and trust that must 
accompany the affirmation for something to be faith. But what is it that separates Christian hope 
from faith? Hope and faith are very similar to each other. Both are based on an affirmation of 
some proposition, but there is something more foundational about faith. Faith is primarily 
focused on the object of that faith whereas hope’s focus is on that object’s relationship to 
ourselves. We can have faith that God is good, but when we hope in God’s goodness we hope 
that he will extend that goodness to us and those around us. We do not merely believe things 
about God or about the people around us, but we believe that the things we have faith in will also 
bring about our best good. This is not to say that hope is completely self-centered, but it does 
include the recognition that the faith one has will lead to her good. It is the difference between 
just believing that God is good and believing that that goodness is good news for you. 
I have talked a lot about the importance of faith to hope, but what is the basis for this faith that 
leads us to hope? One might think that if Christian hope involves belief without certainty, it 
requires tricking yourself into believing something that you have no reason to believe. But this is 
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not how Christian hope works. Rather, this hope is partially validated by experiences of the past, 
as I mentioned earlier in my paper. 
“Beyond bodily resurrection, there are many Christian objectual hopes that have an event 
or promise of God as their objective rational ground, on the Christian account. Hope for 
deliverance from enemies rests on the actual event of God rescuing Israel from enemies 
in the past and God’s faithful character, which invites trust for future deliverance. We can 
rationally hope for God’s kingdom to come, and the new heavens and the new earth, both 
because Christ promises to come again and bring with him the kingdom of God, and 
because God has already accomplished the condition for this occurring by defeating 
death” (Jeffrey 2019, 51). 
Christians have faith and hope in God because of what he has done for them in the past. There is 
a recurring theme in the Old Testament of telling the younger generations about the great things 
God had done for his people in the past. The idea was that it was important to constantly be 
reminded of the past works of God as a basis for present hope in him. The events that we look 
back to have changed over time. In Ancient Israel the basis for the hope in God was his 
deliverance of the Jewish people from Israel, whereas modern Christians would look back to the 
resurrection of Jesus as the grounding belief for our faith, as well as other things. Perhaps a 
Christian can look back to a certain encounter he had with God as an event that grounds his 
hope. Whatever the specific event(s), the fact remains that the Christian’s hope and faith are 
grounded in the past, which allows for justification in believing that a future event will come to 
pass. But there are other considerations that justify hope, one being the action it enables in the 
future. When someone has hope, it enables them to carry on despite hard circumstances. If one 
thinks there is no hope for the future, she will not feel motivated to act in the moment. Both 
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evidential and practical reasons justify hopes. Now that I have discussed the ancient Christian 
view of hope, I will lay out two contemporary accounts and discuss whether Christian hope can 
be reconciled with either of them. 
         The first account I want to lay out is that of Sharon Ryan. In her paper, “Evidentialism, 
Hope, and Wisdom” she argues that while it is important to have hope, it simultaneously appears 
to be irrational. She argues that wise people tend to have hope for the future, but hope for the 
future “requires one to make emotional and intellectual leaps beyond, or despite one’s evidence” 
(Ryan 2018, 281). But she previously asserted that “If S is wise, then the vast majority of S’s 
doxastic attitudes fit her evidence” (Ryan 2018, 280). So how can these two conflicting claims 
be reconciled? Ryan’s solution is to treat hope as a disposition rather than as a doxastic state. She 
uses the term (FIT) to describe scenarios where the evidence does not necessarily imply one 
conclusion. She defines FIT as when “S’s evidence fits a rationally evaluable non-doxastic 
cognitive attitude A iff either (i) S’s total evidence supports A or (ii) S’s total evidence supports 
neither A nor ~A” (Ryan 2018, 287). What Ryan means by this is that if one’s evidence leans 
towards the possibility of a proposition being true but is indecisive, or if it is neutral regarding 
the truth of a proposition, it is acceptable for one to have an attitude of hope towards that 
proposition, assuming it does not involve actually believing that the proposition is true. 
 She explains this using the example of Regina, a woman who is getting married in two 
years. Her hope is that she will be able to dance with her 87-year-old grandfather at her wedding, 
but due to his poor health, there is no real way of knowing whether or not this will happen. Ryan 
argues that she can have a disposition of hope without really believing that her grandfather will 
be able to dance with her at her wedding. Ryan’s concern is that if we throw aside evidential 
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standards for belief that could cause us to have unwarranted hope, it could lead us to acting 
foolishly. While this is a legitimate concern, I believe that it is a flawed response to the problem. 
         Now there is a somewhat trivial way in which this account of hope is reconcilable with 
the Christian account of hope. Because Christian hope is said to be grounded in the evidence of 
what God has done in the past, one could reconcile Ryan’s account of hope with the Christian 
account, but I think there is a much more fundamental way in which these accounts cannot be 
reconciled. The major difference between these two accounts is the view of what hope actually 
is. For Christians, an essential aspect of hope is that fact that it is something in which we have 
some level of belief that it is true, small or great. Hope is not just a non-doxastic attitude that one 
takes towards a proposition, but it is something that we genuinely believe is likely to be true. 
And I believe this is the only way to have genuine hope. This is not to say that it is impossible to 
have doubt and simultaneously hope, or that hope cannot carry someone along when belief is 
fading, but hope is of no value if it is not grounded in belief. Bryan Stevenson, whose example I 
expand on below, says at one point in his book, Just Mercy, “Still, I forced myself to be hopeful” 
(Stevenson 128). While this may not seem like genuine belief, what Stevenson is saying is that 
he forced himself to believe that despite the odds, his efforts would not be in vain. It was not a 
disposition of hope, but a belief against the evidence that he would succeed. It is easy enough to 
say that one can have a disposition of hope without actually believing a proposition, but I do not 
see how it is possible to do so. I cannot hope for God to bring about justice in the world if I do 
not believe that he will do so. Again, one does not need to be 100% certain of the thing she hopes 
for, but if she does not have a belief that the object of her hope will come to pass, at most, what 
she has is an optimistic disposition, but it does not qualify as hope. The Christian concept of 
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hope is not reconcilable with Ryan’s, and I believe beyond that, there is good reason to reject her 
account. 
A different account of hope that I believe can be reconciled with Christian account is 
Miriam Schleifer McCormick’s that is found in her paper “Rational Hope”. McCormick sets up a 
holistic framework for evaluating the rationality of hope. She sets up four criteria for evaluating 
that are as follows: “(i) The likelihood of the hoped-for outcome obtaining, (ii) The goodness or 
significance of the hoped-for outcome, (iii) The significance and the benefits to the agent of 
having the attitude, (iv) The likelihood of hope having an effect on the outcome” (McCormick 
2017, 132). One major issue with purely evidentialist accounts of hope is that they only focus on 
the evidential aspect, but there is more that goes into justifying belief and hope than just the 
evidential aspects. But within McCormick’s framework hope is evaluated from multiple different 
angles, making it a more complete account of hope. There are certainly differences between this 
account of hope and the Christian account, but I believe that when Christian hope is analyzed 
through the lens of McCormick’s account, we will see that the Christian concept of hope is 
rational. I will now attempt to show that the hope essential to Christian beliefs can be reconciled 
with McCormick’s account of rational hope by using a few ancient and modern examples. 
         The first example I want to use is a passage in the Bible that follows as such: 
“Remember my affliction and my wanderings, 
the wormwood and the gall! 
My soul continually remembers it 
and is bowed down within me. 
But this I call to mind, 
and therefore I have hope: 
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The steadfast love of the LORD never ceases; 
his mercies never come to an end; 
they are new every morning; 
great is your faithfulness. 
“The LORD is my portion,” says my soul, 
“therefore I will hope in him.” (Lamentations 3: 19-24). 
In this passage, the author is beginning to despair about life because of the hardships he is 
going through. This is a somewhat common theme throughout scripture, particularly in the more 
poetic books like the Psalms. In this passage the author is afflicted with unspecified hardships, but 
in the midst of these afflictions he calls to mind God’s faithfulness to him throughout his life and 
this gives him hope for the future. So, to begin, I think we can safely say that there is a good chance 
of this outcome obtaining. The author roots his hope for the future in what God has done for him 
in the past and what he perceived God doing in his day to day life. It is God’s mercies that are 
“new every morning” that give him hope that God will have mercy on him in the future, and for 
this reason I believe we can say that the hoped for outcome is likely to obtain. The next criteria is 
the goodness of the hoped for outcome. While it is not specifically laid out in this passage what 
that outcome is, it is clear that the desired outcome involves the author’s psychological and 
physical circumstances improving. The author is desiring nothing wrong, but rather is asking that 
God would save him from the hardships he is undergoing. I also think there is a clear benefit to 
this attitude of hope. Many times in the Christian experience, the reason one doubts God and loses 
hope is not based on a careful evaluation of the evidence, but rather because one loses sight of the 
bigger picture in the face of hardship. For example, one might understand that suffering in one’s 
own life is not a sign that God has abandoned him, but in the moment all he can think about is the 
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suffering, and so loses sight of what he knows to be true. This attitude of hope can be profoundly 
beneficial, as we even see it was for the author, because it can cause us to look past our current 
situation and put into perspective how our current situation fits into the bigger picture of life. 
Finally, I think this hope that the author has will help bring about the desired outcome. Ultimately 
the author says that his hope is in God, but the author, I believe, would also say that he must be 
actively looking out for what God is doing. If the author were to get lost in despair, he could end 
up missing what God was trying to tell him, and even miss the mercies that God was showing to 
him. On the whole, I believe that the hope described by this passage counts as rational according 
to McCormick’s criteria. 
The other example that I want to analyze is that of Bryan Stevenson. Stevenson is a lawyer 
who has spent his career fighting for justice for people who have been wrongly put on death row. 
His book, Just Mercy, follows his legal battle to reverse Walter MacMillian’s death sentence. 
Walter had been wrongly accused of murder in rural Alabama, even though the evidence clearly 
pointed to his innocence. The book also follows other cases picked up by Stevenson and his other 
coworkers at the Equal Justice Initiative which he started to take on cases of the falsely accused. 
He faces an extraordinary amount of hardship in fighting for his clients in the corrupt, racist 
systems they found themselves in, and he talks many times about how he needed hope to give him 
the strength to keep fighting. At one point in the book he discusses giving talks at local churches 
about hopefulness. He quotes a Czech leader who said that hope was the only thing that the people 
of Eastern Europe needed to make it through a time the period of Soviet rule. Stevenson says, “the 
only thing they needed was hope. Not that pie in the sky stuff, not a preference for optimism over 
pessimism, but rather ‘an orientation of the spirit.’ The kind of hope that creates a willingness to 
position oneself in a hopeless place to be a witness, that allows one to believe in a better future, 
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even in the face of abuse of power. That kind of hope makes one strong” (Stevenson 2014, 219). 
This hope is profoundly relevant and is the hope that causes people to fight injustice even when 
things seem bleak. It is important to note what Stevenson is talking about here. He openly rejects 
merely adopting an optimistic attitude but rather, talks about genuinely believing that what might 
seem impossible, can truly come to pass. 
I believe this example of hope is also justified according to McCormick’s criteria. The first 
criterion is the one that is most questionable, but I still think we can say that Stevenson’s case 
meets it. Though it certainly seems that in the cases Stevenson was dealing with it would not be 
possible for him to overcome the corrupt systems he was fighting, ultimately he does win the major 
cases he took on, so there certainly was a possibility of the desired outcome attaining. It is more 
obvious that Stevenson’s case meets the final criteria. Reversing the sentence of a man falsely 
accused of murder and fighting a racist system is undeniably a good outcome to hope for. And 
since hoping for that outcome is what kept Stevenson and others like him fighting for their causes 
despite the outcome not seeming likely, an added benefit of this hope is that it made the desired 
outcome more likely. 
While I believe that hope should be grounded in reality, and one should believe that what 
he hopes for is actually possible, hope is also justified by its outcomes. It is so essential, especially 
in the world we live in today, that we have hope because it is essential in pushing us to strive 
towards change and a better future. And I believe Christianity provides hope like this. Many argue 
that Christianity is a vehicle against social change and just forces people to cheerfully accept the 
world as it is with the hope that they can go to heaven in the future, but this is not correct. NT 
Wright argues in this book Surprised by Hope that the doctrine of the resurrection is key to 
Christianity and should promote striving towards making the world in a better place in hope of the 
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resurrection in the future. He says, “It was people who believed robustly in the resurrection, not 
people who compromised and went in for a mere spiritualized survival, who stood up against 
Caesar in the first centuries of the Christian era” (Wright 2008, 26). Wright continues to provide 
other examples throughout history where orthodox Christians with robust theology of the 
resurrection were in the forefront of social change. One of the reasons that Bryan Stevenson has 
the hope he does and has made such a profound impact on the world today is because of his 
Christian beliefs. Hope is so important because without it, so much of the change we so desperately 
need will never come about. We need hope to keep us working towards a better future in a world 
that so often looks bleak and devoid of hope, and as I have shown in this section of my paper, 
Christianity offers that hope.  
VI. Christianity and Conspiracy Theories 
Up to this point I have given a detailed explanation of why Christian beliefs are justified, 
but there are many objections to this. Rather than try to cover the numerous specific challenges 
to Christian belief that have been brought up over the years, I want to bring up an objection to 
how I have set up my whole argument. The reason I am not going to answer specific objections 
to Christian belief are that there are too many for me to answer and they lie outside the scope of 
this paper. Most, if not all, of these objections have been answered elsewhere by philosophers 
and historians much more qualified than me. For the purpose of this paper I want to discuss an 
objection to my argument more generally. I argued earlier that Christian belief can be cultivated 
in such a way that is conducive to intellectual virtues, but this is a controversial claim. One could 
object that Christian beliefs are adopted in the same intellectually vicious way that many 
conspiracy theories are, requiring one to be credulous and closed-minded. For the rest of this 
paper I will argue that this comparison is unwarranted.  
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There are different views on what the precise definition of a conspiracy theory is, but I 
will use one of the more derogatory ones. Karl Popper talks about the “Conspiracy Theory of 
Society” which is “the theory that everything that happens (or at least everything big and bad that 
happens) is due to a successful conspiracy, that is, that the big bad thing that happens is due to a 
secret plan to bring about exactly that big bad thing” (Coady 2012, 111-112). Now this is not the 
most fair treatment of conspiracy theories. Some have evidential support and even turn out to be 
correct. But the idea which is vital for this section of my paper is the idea that many times 
conspiracy theories are more driven by the way people think rather than the evidence itself. What 
I mean by this is that people who believe conspiracy theories will tend to have a lot of evidence 
for their positions. When one holds to ideas that contradict the established orthodoxy, one must 
research extensively, but these pieces of evidence will not be properly contextualized. Rather, 
they will look exclusively for evidence that supports the conclusion that they want to believe and 
ignore contradictory evidence. Or perhaps they will give evidence that seems to support their 
argument at first glance, but can be easily explained away, like the strange flight patterns that 
flat-earthers will bring up. 
 Quassim Cassam creates the example of Oliver, a man who believes just about every 
conspiracy theory that there is. He says about this imaginary person, “Those who know him well 
say that he is easily duped, and you have independent evidence that he is careless in his 
thinking…” (Cassam 2015). Whether or not there are true conspiracy theories, or one could be 
justified in believing some of them, it is safe to say that people who frequently latch onto far-
fetched conspiracy theories display intellectual vice. Cassam goes as far as to say that we cannot 
really understand why conspiracy theorists believe the things they do by looking at their reasons, 
but rather, we must look at their intellectual character. 
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But what does this have to do with religious beliefs? One could argue that those who hold 
religious beliefs display the same intellectual vices that one who holds to farfetched conspiracy 
theories does. Many, particularly those who are more educated, would suggest that for anyone to 
believe the basic tenets of Christianity, he has to believe things that are patently false and close 
his mind off to evidence that clearly contradicts his views. Perhaps one might grant that the 
practical reasons for Christian beliefs are compelling. Christian beliefs may be able to provide a 
sense of identity, stability, and hope, but they also require intellectual vice to cultivate them. The 
two intellectual vices that I will focus on in relation to Christian belief are credulity (or gullibility 
as Cassam puts it) and closed mindedness. 
Are Christians gullible? Do people who believe the teachings of the Bible share much in 
common with those who go to flat-earth conventions? In short, “no.” This does not mean there 
are no credulous Christians; there are many gullible people in the world, and many of those 
credulous people are Christians. Recently, I was staying with my grandparents who live in a 
more rural area and saw an infomercial about miracle water that would mysteriously change your 
life for the small price of giving your credit card information to a random televangelist. Putting 
aside the fact that selling miracle water to poor, vulnerable people is something condemned in 
the Bible, this kind of gullibility is not necessary to accept Christianity or in any way a result of 
Christian belief. This is merely how a gullible person would approach Christianity. 
One of the basic tenets of the Christian faith that is often targeted when talking about 
credulity is the belief in miracles. I will note that we should be skeptical about miracles. If 
miracles do, in fact, happen, they happen very rarely, and so when people say that they have 
performed a miracle, or know someone who has, we obviously should be skeptical about this. 
But there are some miracles that one must believe in to have anything resembling orthodox 
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Christian beliefs. The one I will discuss in this paper is the Resurrection of Jesus because it is the 
center of all Christian belief. It is the basis of everything that a Christian believes. Now David 
Hume, who has been profoundly influential and whose philosophy has shaped much of modern 
thinking, rejected the idea that believing in miracles could be epistemically justified. Hume uses 
the examples of the miracles found in the New Testament to talk about the irrationality of 
believing in miracles. He says, 
“the authority either of the Scripture or of tradition is founded merely in the testimony of 
the Apostles who were eyewitnesses to those miracles of our by which by which he 
proved his divine mission. Our evidence then for the truth of the Christian religion is less 
than for the truth of our senses, because even in the first authors of our religion it was no 
greater” (Hume 623). 
What Hume is saying here is that our only evidence for the miracles in the Bible is 
testimony of the Apostles who recorded his actions. But we, according to Hume, know that 
miracles are not likely to happen because we do not experience them in our daily lives, and the 
majority of people we know have never witnessed a miracle5. Hume believes that since we have 
good evidence  that the laws of nature work without exception, we have good reason to refrain 
from  believing in miracles. Hume uses an example that if every historian agreed that on January 
1, 1600, Queen Elizabeth died, was viewed by doctors before and after her death, was buried, 
had her successor announced, and then, a month later she resumed her leadership of the throne, 
he would not believe that she had genuinely rose from the dead because it would contradict all 
his experiences, and he would be more sure that her death had been faked or some sinister plot 
 
5 And typically, if we do meet someone who has “witnessed a miracle”, they have either been tricked by a malicious 
person, mislead by a well-meaning but credulous person, or have just witnessed something that is statistically 
unlikely and called it a miracle. 
Bonsell 42 
 
had been carried out than the real occurrence of a miracle (Hume 631). Now Hume does not go 
on to condemn religious beliefs, but he does conclude one must believe them based purely on 
faith, and that they cannot be epistemically justified (Hume 632). 
Hume is correct that faith is an essential part of believing in the resurrection, and more 
broadly Christian doctrine, but I think he is wrong to say that there is not a good evidential 
reason to believe in it. The further problem is that Hume’s view of miracles relies on faulty view 
of weighing evidence. According to Hume, even if there was ample evidence to say that a 
miracle had happened, you would be wise to still not believe that a miracle had happened 
because that evidence would be outweighed by one’s evidence of miracles not happening. But a 
problem with Hume’s reasoning here is that there is not an obvious way to way different pieces 
of evidence against each other. We might reasonably choose to be skeptical of evidence that 
seems to point towards miraculous activity because we think there is good evidence that miracles 
do not happen, but there is not a precise way to determine how to weigh the different pieces of 
evidence. I will demonstrate this point using a section from Surprised by Hope. According to NT 
Wright, some historical evidence exists for the resurrection of Jesus, such as Jesus’s empty tomb 
and the transformation of his followers from average fishermen to the leaders of what became a 
major world religion. But there will be many who are unconvinced by this evidence, and the 
reason is, they believe that there is stronger evidence in favor of resurrections not occurring, and 
so seek other explanations. These explanations may not fit the historical/circumstantial evidence 
as well as believing in the Resurrection might, but many would argue, these explanations better 
fit the entirety of our evidence (particularly the evidence that miracles do not happen). But there 
is no simple way of determining which evidence should be weighed more heavily. For example, 
cannot calculate the percentage chance of a miracle occurring. And so, many choose to weigh the 
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evidence against miracles more heavily. Wright says in response to that, “That is fine; I respect 
that position; but… it is indeed then a matter of choice, not a matter of saying something called 
scientific historiography forces us to take that route” (Wright 2008, 63). It is a perfectly 
reasonable position to give more weight to arguments against miracles, but it is a position that 
one must just choose, it is not one the evidence forces us into. 
We can take from this that Christians are not just credulous for believing in miracles. 
What is true is that at some point when evaluating evidence regarding certain doctrines or 
beliefs, one must choose what assumptions to make and what evidence to weigh more heavily. 
Just because a Christian believer chooses to weigh the historical evidence for a resurrection or 
any other doctrine more heavily than evidence she has that miracles do not occur often does not 
make her credulous. Now I will discuss the accusation that Christians are closed-minded. 
Most people I know, including myself, know someone who is deeply engrossed in all 
kinds of crazy conspiracy theories. Typically, when someone like that is presented with evidence 
that contradicts their conspiracies, the response is to immediately close oneself off to that data. 
The usual way is to undermine the legitimacy of every media outlet except for some Infowars-
like YouTube channel. This is clearly intellectually vicious behavior. Closing one’s mind off to 
anything that would contradict one’s beliefs is unhealthy, and this way of thinking keeps people 
stuck believing pernicious conspiracies. It is easy to write off people who act in this way, but 
some might argue that this is just an exaggerated version of what Christians do. For one thing, as 
I argued earlier in this paper, Christian experience justifies Christian beliefs. And if we trust our 
experience, does that not involve writing off all the billions of non-Christians’ experiences? 
Furthermore, I argued that Christians should have an epistemic partiality towards their beliefs, 
which again, seems like I am arguing against seriously engaging with views other than my own. 
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But on further investigation, it becomes clearer that this is not what I am saying. While I argue 
that we should value our own religious experiences and seriously consider them as evidence, we 
should never do this at the exclusion of the experience of others. This does not mean that we will 
not ultimately determine our own experiences to be true religious experiences, but we will not 
just cut ourselves off from those who disagree with us. This is evidence that must be weighed 
against our own. And while I argued that we should show epistemic partiality towards our own 
religious beliefs, I showed that this would ultimately make the believer more open to ideas that 
contradicted his own because it provides a safe place from which he can explore new ideas. 
Many people assume Christians are close-minded because they have met close-minded 
Christians before, but as I have argued in this paper, this should not be the case. Open-
mindedness is compatible with Christian belief and should accompany it. 
VII. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that there are both evidential and practical factors that justify 
Christian belief. I have argued that one can have an evidential foundation for believing 
Christianity based on her religious experience. But I went on to argue that this evidential 
foundation is bolstered by practical considerations. I emphasized the importance of intellectual 
loyalty as well as the hope that Christian beliefs provide. In this paper, I did not attempt to come 
up with some novel arguments in defense of Christian belief. Simply put, I wanted to show that 
one could be a good thinker and also be a Christian: that one does not have to stop being 
thoughtful to accept Christian beliefs. I hope to have shown that Christian beliefs should not only 
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